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 ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS AS PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT 
Abby L. Timmons* 
On the whole, the dismantling of monopolies relies heavily on public 
enforcement.  While the opportunity for private enforcement exists in the antitrust 
context, it is limited, as not all so-called “monopolies” commit antitrust violations.1   
For example, where barriers to entry in a particular industry are high—such as in the 
case of phone carriers or airlines, both of which must build an infrastructure to 
support their business
2—sufficient competition may not exist to create options for 
the consumer.  In situations like these, the federal government generally must step 
in to break up the monopoly.  However, this interference happens infrequently, and 
these efforts are not always successful.
3
  Thus, public enforcement in the monopoly 
context might benefit from additional private enforcement.  However, traditional 
private enforcement will not be available to break up effective monopolies which 
have not committed antitrust violations.  One possible solution could be a form of 
private enforcement engineered via intentional monopoly breakup, where many 
smaller companies work in concert to undercut the price of the functional monopoly 
and later to disseminate its market share.  Unfortunately, “private enforcement” of 
this type is likely to violate antitrust law in itself.
4
  However, from a policy 
standpoint, such violations ought to be permissible, because they achieve antitrust 
law’s “fundamental goal of . . . protect[ing] consumer[]” welfare.5  
 
 * Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in Professional Writing, 
Purdue University, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Veronica Root Martinez for her 
stimulating Corporate Compliance class, which inspired this paper, and Matthew Billeci for his 
edits and suggestions.  I am additionally very grateful for the editing efforts of the 
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection team.  All errors are my own.  
 1  Indeed, the layman’s term “monopoly,” as used here, does not necessarily implicate a 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2, which criminalizes monopolization.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 2  See generally J.B. Maverick, How Strong Are the Barriers to Entry for New Companies 
in the Telecommunications Sector?, INVESTOPEDIA (July 15, 2015), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/071515/how-strong-are-barriers-entry-new-
companies-telecommunications-sector.asp; Jad Mouawad, The Challenge of Starting an Airline, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/business/start-up-airlines-face-
big-obstacles.html. 
 3  See infra Part I.  
 4  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 5  John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192 (2008). 
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This Essay will argue that total reliance upon public enforcement to break up 
monopolies or effective monopolies is insufficient to protect consumer welfare and 
that the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (“DOJ” or “DOJ Antitrust”) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should consider “private enforcement” via 
intentional monopoly breakup a complete defense to any antitrust violations.  This 
argument will proceed in four main parts.  First, it will develop the background of 
the eBooks industry’s history as context for the United States v. Apple6  decision.  
Next it will discus the United States v. Apple case, which highlights the 
consequences for corporations who try to privately break up existing monopolies 
under current law.  This Essay will then examine some of the shortcomings of public 
enforcement in the antitrust sphere before detailing ways in which private 
enforcement through intentional monopoly breakup could be a preferable 
mechanism for prevention of monopolies.  
I.     THE EBOOK INDUSTRY LEAD-UP 
Amazon released the Kindle in late 2007.
7
  The eReader was enormously 
popular amongst consumers despite its hefty price tag of $399, but the pricing 
structure Amazon formulated behind the scenes was disruptive to the publishing 
industry.
8
  To encourage consumers to purchase eBooks, Amazon would buy books 
at their wholesale prices from publishing companies, and then sell them at a loss to 
consumers, notoriously for $9.99.
9
  This pricing scheme meant that Amazon lost 
money on many sales, especially new releases, but gained market power, as 
consumers flocked to purchase eBooks at a lower price than physical books and 
bought into the Amazon eBooks infrastructure by purchasing Kindles.
1 0
  By 2010, 
Amazon’s Kindle had a ninety percent share of the eBooks market.1 1  
Traditional publishing companies felt threatened by Amazon’s approach to 
eBook sales.
1 2
  Their concerns were twofold: first, that the sales of physical books, 
 
 6  791 F.3d 290, 316 (2d Cir. 2015). 




 8  Id. (discussing the “precipitous[]” drop in sales of physical books following the Kindle’s 
release).  
 9 See Vauhini Vara, Did Apple Fix E-Book Prices for the Greater Good?, NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/apple-claiming-virtue-e-book-
price-fixing-case.  
 10  See id.  
 11 Rory Maher, Here’s Why Amazon Will Win the eBook War: Kindle Already Has 90% 
eBook Market Share, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-
selling-90-of-all-e-books-2010-1. 
 12  See Ylan Q. Mui & Hayley Tsukayama, Justice Department Sues Apple, Publishers over 
e-Book Prices, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/justice-department-files-suit-against-
apple-publishers-report-says/2012/04/11/gIQAzyXSAT_story.html?utm_term=.11e7eb398135.  
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upon which they depended for “much” of their revenue, would continue to decline, 
with consumers ultimately demanding lower prices for books altogether.
1 3
  Second, 
publishers feared that Amazon would one day be able to “bypass publishers 
altogether” by working directly with authors to sell their content.1 4   Publishing 
company Hachette called Amazon the real industry predator, claiming that the 
underpricing of eBooks was an “effort to exclude competitors.”1 5   The Big Six 
publishing companies began meeting in fall 2008 to decide what to do about “the 
$9.99 problem.”1 6  
In 2009, prior to the release of the iPad, Apple and five of the Big Six 
publishing companies designed a plan that was intended to loosen Amazon’s 
stranglehold on the eBook market.
1 7
  Together they formulated a business model 
wherein publishers would set the price of the Apple-offered eBooks, up to a 
maximum price of $14.99.
1 8
  However, if Apple discovered that another eBook 
provider was selling that publication for a lower price, Apple was permitted to adjust 
the price to match that lower value.
1 9
  Once the iPad launched in 2010, the publishers 
presented the same deal to Amazon, and threatened to pull their eBooks from 
Amazon listings if the deal was not accepted.
2 0
  Amazon accepted the deal, and 
eBook prices rose as a result.
2 1   
II.     UNITED STATES V. APPLE AND ITS ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
Once uncovered, the business model designed by Apple and the five publishing 
companies was found to contain both horizontal and vertical violations of antitrust 
law.
2 2
  As a result, the Second Circuit imposed a four-part injunction upon Apple, 
which severely limited its ability to gain a comparable foothold in the eBook 
market.
2 3
  Since the ruling in 2015, Amazon’s dominance of the eBook market has 
 
 13  Vara, supra note 9; see also, e.g., Mui & Tsukayama, supra note 12. 
 14  Mui & Tsukayama, supra note 12.  Publishers have seen this fear recognized with the 
advent of Kindle Direct Publishing, which allows authors to self-publish eBooks and paperbacks 
for free through Amazon.  See Kindle Direct Publishing, Self-Publishing, AMAZON, 
https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
 15  Mui & Tsukayama, supra note 12.  
 16  See id. 
 17  VERONICA ROOT, ETHICAL COMPLIANCE 327–29 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 18 See Vara, supra note 9. 
 19  See id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id.  
 22 See Roger Parloff, US v. Apple Could Go to the Supreme Court, FORTUNE (June 5, 2013), 
https://fortune.com/2013/06/05/us-v-apple-could-go-to-the-supreme-court/.  
 23  ROOT, supra note 17, at 332–33; see also United States v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
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risen from seventy-four percent of market share to approximately eighty-three 
percent.
2 4   
It would be difficult to argue that Apple had not committed an antitrust 
violation in the course of the business model’s development: the agreement 
pertained to interstate commerce, required concerted action on behalf of the 
publishing companies and Apple, and placed an unreasonable restraint upon trade, 
as it interfered with previously accepted industry norms.
2 5
  However, whether this 
antitrust violation is truly wrongful is debatable.  Apple’s behavior was not geared 
toward heightening eBook prices unreasonably; instead, their intent was to work 
with the publishing companies to carve out a space large enough for Apple to 
compete in the eBook market.
2 6
  Some who followed the case felt sympathetic 
toward Apple and the publishers, who were seen as attempting to break up Amazon’s 
effective monopoly.
2 7
  Even the panel of Second Circuit judges who heard oral 
argument in the case seemed to consider Apple’s position credible, with Judge 
Raymond Lohier Jr. asking the Justice Department how Apple and the publishers 




Amazon, for its part, is unlikely to have committed an antitrust violation.  
While the eBook sales constitute interstate commerce, there was no external 
agreement with publishers that placed an unreasonable restraint upon trade.
2 9
  
Although Amazon’s business operations harmed publishers, who worried that the 
scheme would impact their ability to sell paper books in brick-and-mortar stores,
3 0
 
Amazon’s near-monopoly does not appear to violate antitrust law.3 1  
It is appropriate, then, to ask whether the outcome of United States v. Apple is 
one with which the public should be comfortable.  Apple’s attempt to enter the 
 
 24 See Mark Gurman, Apple’s Getting Back into the E-Books Fight Against Amazon, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/apple-is-
said-to-ready-revamped-e-books-push-against-amazon.  
 25  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 26  See ROOT, supra note 17, at 328.  Indeed, the prices of some eBooks fell after Apple 
entered the market.  See Vara, supra note 9. 
 27  See Parloff, supra note 22 (“While the publishers’ motivations may have been unusual—
some would argue laudable—there is much evidence that they did, in fact, collude.”). 
 28 See  N.Y. Court Weighs Apple, Amazon eBook Arguments, COLUMBIAN (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.columbian.com/news/2014/dec/15/ny-court-weighs-apple-amazon-e-book-
arguments/.  In answer, the attorney for the DOJ indicated that Apple could have “let the 
competitive forces of the market with a powerful new entrant play out naturally or could have filed 
a lawsuit” with the DOJ.  Id.  However, in order to file a lawsuit with the DOJ against Amazon, a 
colorable case that Amazon was committing antitrust violations would have needed to exist.  This 
Essay concludes that it did not.  
 29  ROOT, supra note 17, at 327 (discussing Amazon’s business plan to sell eBooks at a loss). 
 30  Id. at 327–28. 
 31  For an excellent discussion of Amazon’s conglomerate dominance and the issues it poses 
for traditional antitrust application, see Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 
710 (2017). 
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market resulted in numerous injunctions, while Amazon’s effective monopoly was 
preserved.
3 2
  Is this how antitrust law is intended to operate?  
When monopolies become too large, the government can step in and force a 
breakup, even without the corporation having committed an antitrust violation.
3 3
  
Examples of this include the breakups of American Tobacco, Standard Oil, and 
AT&T.
3 4
  However, such government interventions are infrequent, despite the clear 
intent of antitrust law to prevent monopolies.
3 5
  Because of the government’s 
hesitancy to involve itself, public enforcement alone may be insufficient to protect 




In compliance literature, the benefits and detriments of both public and private 
enforcement have been extolled.
3 7
  Some industries tolerate both public, 
governmental enforcement and private, litigant-driven enforcement.
3 8
  Antitrust is 
one such industry—private litigants are entitled to bring Sherman Act allegations 
against a corporation.
3 9
  However, antitrust is a fairly esoteric area of the law, so it 
is unlikely many private individuals would bring such lawsuits.
4 0
  Even the DOJ, in 
its informational pamphlet on antitrust law, encourages consumers simply to provide 
pertinent information to the agency, rather than attempt a lawsuit.
4 1
  The pamphlet 
further mentions the difficulty in “detect[ing] and prov[ing]” antitrust violations, 
suggesting inexperienced private litigants might struggle to bring suit.
4 2
  
Additionally, individual use of the court system is time-consuming and not always 
successful.  In the Amazon context, even if an individual had brought suit against 
the corporation, it is unlikely that an antitrust violation would have been found.
4 3
  
Instead of relying on individual litigants, private enforcement via direct monopoly 
breakup might be more effective in the long run, because it could allow corporations 
 
 32  See Gurman, supra note 24. 
 33 See Andrew Beattie, A History of U.S. Monopolies, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/insights/history-of-us-monopolies/. 
 34 See id. 
 35  See id.  
 36 For example, Microsoft was found to be a monopoly that should be broken up, but it “never 
actually” was.  Id.  
 37  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
637 (2013). 
 38  Id. at 661 (calling the regimes tolerating both public and private enforcement “hybrid”). 
 39  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).  
 40  Id. (“Many consumers have never heard of antitrust laws . . . .”).  But see generally Daniel 
A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2010) (claiming that 
private enforcement of antitrust is actually the majority approach in the United States, but calling 
for an overhaul of the system to improve its effectiveness). 
 41 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39. 
 42  Id. 
 43  See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
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like Apple to make agreements that intentionally interfere with the monopoly’s 
market share.
4 4   
As above, agreements of this nature that involve multiple actors are generally 
criminalized under antitrust law.
4 5
  In order to allow private enforcement of this type 
to take place, DOJ Antitrust and the FTC should consider treating such “private 
enforcement” as a complete defense to an antitrust violation in very limited 
situations.
4 6
  For example, private enforcement via monopoly breakup should be 
allowable where seventy-five percent of the market share belongs to one corporation 
that operates in such a manner that no other business could financially afford to 
compete.  In Apple, Amazon would have qualified as a corporation with a monopoly 
whose breakup would be allowable, even if the breakup violated antitrust law.
4 7
  
With the defense of private enforcement successfully raised, Apple would have been 
allowed to enter the market, and the publishing companies would have been 
absolved of the fear that Amazon would put them out of business.  Amazon’s eBooks 
monopoly likely would have slackened somewhat, with the end result that private 
enforcement by Apple had pro-competitive effects, despite being a textbook 
violation of antitrust law.
4 8   
It is necessary to acknowledge a few potential shortcomings of this version of 
private enforcement.  First, one troubling possibility could be private enforcement 
leading to revolving door monopolies, wherein two main competitors gather allies 
to interfere with the other’s market share repeatedly.  One possible way to temper 
this could be to require clean hands in the raising of the private enforcement defense, 
similar to the requirement of having clean hands in equity.
4 9
  Beyond this, it would 
be critical to set an appropriate quantitative limit on the percentage of the market a 
functional monopoly must occupy before private enforcement could occur.  If the 
number is too high—such that the monopoly owns ninety percent of the market 
share—this theory of private enforcement likely cannot prevail, as the monopoly 
owns so much of the market as to be overwhelming, even when competitors work in 
concert against it.  On the other hand, if the number is too low, this theory of private 
enforcement has the potential to be abused, either via revolving door monopolies, as 
 
 44  For the remainder of the Essay, I will not use scare quotes around the term private 
enforcement, though I acknowledge the type of private enforcement being encouraged here differs 
substantially from the typical conceptualization of the term.  See generally Burbank et al., supra 
note 37. 
 45  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 46  I suggest use of a complete defense mechanism rather than mitigation credit, as one would 
want to incentivize private enforcement.  If a private enforcer would still run the risk of 
accumulating fines and sanctions, these types of monopoly-interfering agreements are less likely 
to occur. 
 47  See Gurman, supra note 24. 
 48  See Parloff, supra note 22 (“Apple brought competition to a market that was, prior to its 
arrival, dominated by an 80% to 90% near-monopolist, Amazon.”). 
 49  See, e.g., 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06[5][a] (3d 
ed. 2019) (discussing how the “clean hands” doctrine may bar an award of injunctive relief if the 
party seeking an injunction has acted in bad faith). 
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above, or simply by sanctioning what ought to be an antitrust violation.  If this theory 
were to be put into practice, it would likely behoove regulators to choose a more 
conservative (higher) percentage of the market share, with the knowledge that they 
could always lessen the number later if needed to incentivize the use of this 
mechanism.  Beyond this, authorizing the concerted competition of rivals, even 
though the monopoly has not violated antitrust law, may seem fundamentally 
unfair.
5 0
  However, if one accepts that the paramount policy goal of antitrust law is 
to promote consumer welfare, allowing concerted private enforcement to interfere 
with the monopoly is likely to achieve the ultimate aim.  
III.     SHORTCOMINGS OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
This Essay takes the position that a private enforcement mechanism is needed 
in the antitrust sphere because there are a number of ways in which public 
enforcement fails to successfully prevent monopolies.  First, prosecutorial discretion 
plays a role in deciding which monopolies ought to be broken up.
5 1
  This is 
problematic because it likely allows some corporations whose market shares are 
near-monopolistic to evade breakup, while other similarly-situated corporations are 
subject to “Sherman’s hammer,”5 2  causing issues of uniformity in enforcement.5 3   
Relatedly, public enforcement in the antitrust space generally occurs through DOJ 
Antitrust or the FTC’s decision to pursue an action.5 4   However, due to historical 
relationships between these agencies and the biggest players in their target 
industries, DOJ Antitrust or the FTC may be vulnerable to capture.
5 5
  This could 
lead to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to play favorites or to characterize 
some monopolies as necessary, even where they are harmful to consumers and 
competition.
5 6
  In the same vein, Daniel Crane argues that “[t]hose who distrust 
private economic monopolies should also distrust public governmental 
 
 50  Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs would at least be inclined to consider this type of competition 
permissible, as he wrote that a “pervasive error” in the United States v. Apple majority opinion was 
its “implicit assumption that competition should be genteel, lawyer-designed, and fair under 
sporting rules.”  791 F.3d 290, 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).  He further suggested that antitrust law 
would not be offended by “gloves-off competition.”  Id.  
 51  This is true of public enforcement more generally as well.  See Burbank et al., supra note 
37, at 667–68. 
 52  See Beattie, supra note 33. 
 53  Issues of uniformity in enforcement also derive from the fact that jurisdiction over antitrust 
cases is split between the DOJ and the FTC, though this is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 54  See Press Release, House Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte Statement at Markup of Smarter 
Act (Apr. 5, 2017), https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-statement-
markup-smarter-act/.  
 55  See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 981 
(2009).  This concern is geared more so toward the FTC, as Baer notes that DOJ attorneys make 
names through prosecutions, not failures to exercise discretion.  Id. at 982. 
 56  See Burbank et al., supra note 37, at 665 (“[A]dministrators may face pressure to under-
enforce from executives or legislatures who may be motivated by . . . the desire to protect specific 
constituents in particular.”). 
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monopolies.”5 7   Some exercise of prosecutorial discretion is needful, but tempering 
its use with successful private enforcement would help to ensure enforcement 
decisions appropriately address areas of concern and minimize fears about nepotism.   
Second, the lag time inherent in public enforcement is harmful to consumers, 
which cuts against the animating principles of antitrust law.  Of course, the time 
lapse between the formation of a monopoly and its government-mandated breakup 
is inevitable: it will take time for the monopoly to be recognized, time for the 
government to decide the monopoly is worth acting upon, and possibly time before 
prosecutorial personnel or financial resources can be dedicated to the problem.  
However, as this time passes, consumers are forced to pay higher prices due to the 
continued existence of the monopoly, which should elevate the monopoly’s conduct 
to an enforcement priority.
5 8
 
Finally, even where public enforcement occurs, there is no guarantee of its 
effectiveness.  AT&T is a prime example of this: although the company was broken 
up into eight separate pieces by the government in 1984, “almost all those companies 
are once again part of AT&T.”5 9   Indeed, the corporation is “more than twice the 
size it was before.”6 0   This may be due to a lack of prosecutorial resources on the 
part of the DOJ or the FTC, who perhaps cannot afford to keep close tabs on 
corporations post-breakup.
6 1
  More concerningly, this could also be a deliberate 
decision by the DOJ or the FTC to allow the company to persist as a functional 
monopoly—whether due to capture or otherwise.  Whatever the reason, the AT&T 
breakup caused by public enforcement did not prevent the company from being a 
monopoly for long, and thus did not ultimately remedy the problem. 
IV.     THE POTENTIAL OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
In their paper Private Enforcement, Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang, and 
Herbert Kritzer detail seven potential benefits of private enforcement as compared 
to public enforcement, noting that each of these benefits’ expression will vary across 
industry and policy domains.
6 2
  This Essay will consider each advantage in the 
context of private enforcement via intentional monopoly breakup in turn, using the 
Apple case as a factual scenario. 
First, the authors point to the increased amount of resources available to private 
enforcement actors, as well as the ability to shift costs away from the beleaguered 
 
 57  Crane, supra note 40, at 677. 
 58  See Victoria Buchholz & Todd Buchholz, In the Age of Uber and Snapchat, Antitrust Law 
Needs an Update, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
antitrust-att-time-warner-20170209-story.html.  
 59  Matthew Stuart, How AT&T Conquered All Forms of Communication After the 
Government Forced It to Break Up, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/att-breakup-1982-directv-bell-system-2018-02.  
 60  Id.  
 61  Burbank et al., supra note 37, at 662.  
 62  Id.  




  Both of these advantages hold true in the Apple case.  The 
resources—both personnel-wise and financially—available to Apple are vast and 
likely to outstrip those dedicated to even the most vigorous of antitrust enforcement 
actions by the DOJ or FTC.  This comports with Private Enforcement’s 
characterization of private enforcement regimes as “self-funding.”6 4   Apple 
attorneys would also likely have fewer matters competing for their attention.  While 
DOJ and FTC attorneys have many different issues to juggle, it is plausible that 
Apple could dedicate a number of individuals solely to the task of interrupting a 
monopoly like Amazon’s.  In the same vein, private enforcement actors have another 
resource in plentiful supply compared to the government—information.6 5   Agency 
specialization is often used as a justification for why particular agencies handle 
particular tasks, but even the most informed bureaucrat is unlikely to possess better 
information about a market than one of the competitors actually entrenched in the 
market.
6 6
  Because of its many conversations with the Big Six publishing 
companies, one can infer that Apple was uniquely poised to compile information 
about the Amazon monopoly, its effects on direct competitors, the concerns of 
suppliers, and the reaction of consumers.
6 7
 
In addition to resource considerations, the authors suggests that private 
enforcement actors may be able to “encourage legal and policy innovation,”6 8  
essentially because their attorneys may be willing to pursue riskier strategies at 
trial.
6 9
  The Apple case does not provide many facts relevant to this purported 
benefit, so it is unclear whether private enforcement in the antitrust context would 
actually encourage such innovation. 
Beyond this, Private Enforcement identifies three more advantages: first, that 
private enforcement signals that enforcement in the applicable area of law will occur, 
even in the event that public enforcement fails or is “subverted.”7 0   Second, and 
relatedly, it postulates that private enforcement limits the need for public 
enforcement agencies to be seen acting in the applicable legal arena,71 likely because 
private enforcement is occurring faithfully.  Finally, it suggests that private 
enforcement can help “facilitate participatory and democratic governance.”7 2   Each 
of these advantages is likely to materialize from an implementation of the private 
enforcement defense to antitrust violations.  The government’s express tolerance for 
intentional agreement among corporations to disrupt another’s monopoly in a 
particular market would send a strong signal that monopolies will not be tolerated, 
 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. at 663. 
 65  Id.  
 66  See id. at 663–64. 
 67  Cf. ROOT, supra note 17, at 328–29. 
 68  See Burbank et al., supra note 37, at 662. 
 69  Id. at 664. 
 70  Id. at 662. 
 71 Id. 
 72  Id. 
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though the mechanism for dismantling them differs significantly from the one used 
at present.  Saliently, competitors in the same industry are unlikely to allow a 
monopoly to re-form, as in the case of AT&T.
7 3
  This could lead to even stronger 
enforcement overall than government-mandated breakup.  If this is the case, there 
would be less need for the DOJ or FTC to intervene in the area.
7 4
  While flowery, 
the final alleged benefit of private enforcement is also likely applicable—private 
enforcement actors may be more willing to buy into a system of antitrust compliance 
that allows them the agency to regulate competitors.  
On the whole, the advantages of private enforcement, particularly with respect 
to the availability of personnel, financial, and informational resources, are 
overwhelming in the antitrust context.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has argued for the availability of a complete defense to antitrust 
violations where corporations act in concert to restrain trade with the intent of 
breaking up an existing monopoly by characterizing such behavior as private 
enforcement.  An analysis of the benefits of private enforcement, as identified in 
Private Enforcement, leads to the conclusion that private enforcement via intentional 
monopoly breakup is likely preferable to the current scheme of public enforcement 
perpetuated by the FTC and DOJ Antitrust.  While public enforcement could still 
play a valuable role as a backstop in the event that concerted action could not 
dismantle an existing monopoly, private enforcement actors should be tolerated even 
where their actions would constitute a violation of antitrust law. 
 
 73  See supra notes 59–60. 
 74  This could circularly increase the amount of resources available to the FTC and DOJ 
Antitrust—a useful backstop in the event of a monopoly too large to be broken by concerted 
competitor effort. 
